Registered Replication Report: A Large Multilab Cross-Cultural Conceptual Replication of Turri et al. (2015)
Braeden Hall, Kathleen Schmidt, Jordan Wagge, Savannah C. Lewis, Sophia C. Weissgerber, Felix Kiunke, Gerit Pfuhl, Stefan Stieger, Ulrich S. Tran, Krystian Barzykowski, Natalia Bogatyreva, Marta Kowal, KarlIJn Massar, Felizitas Pernerstofer, Piotr Sorokowski, Martin Voracek, Christopher R. Chartier, Mark J. Brandt, Jon E. Grahe, Asil A. Özdoğru, Michael R. Andreychik, Sau-Chin Chen, Thomas R. Evans, Caro Hautekiet, Hans IJzerman, Pavol Kačmár, Anthony J. Krafnick, Erica D. Musser, Evie Vergauwe, Kaitlyn M. Werner, Balazs Aczel, Patrícia Arriaga, Carlota Batres, Jennifer L. Beaudry, Florian Cova, Simona Ďurbisová, Leslie D. Cramblet Alvarez, Gilad Feldman, Hendrik Godbersen, Jaroslav Gottfried, Gerald J. Haeffel, Andree Hartanto, Chris Isloi, Joseph P. McFall, Marina Milyavskaya, David Moreau, Ester Nosáľová, Kostas Papaioannou, Susana Ruiz-Fernandez, Jana Schrötter, Daniel Storage, Kevin Vezirian, Leonhard Volz, Yanna J. Weisberg, Qinyu Xiao, Dana Awlia, Hannah W. Branit, Megan R. Dunn, Agata Groyecka-Bernard, Ricky Haneda, Julita Kielinska, Caroline Kolle, Paweł Lubomski, Alexys M. Miller, Martin J. Mækelæ, Mytro Pantazi, Rafael R. Ribeiro, Robert M. Ross, Agnieszka Sorokowska, Christopher L. Aberson, Xanthippi Alexi Vassiliou, Bradley J. Baker, Miklos Bognar, Chin Wen Cong, Alex F. Danvers, William E. Davis, Vilius Dranseika, Andrei Dumbravă, Harry Farmer, Andy P. Field, Patrick S. Forscher, Aurélien Graton, Nandor Hajdu, Peter A. Howlett, Radosław Kabut, Emmett M. Larsen, Sean T. H. Lee, Nicole Legate, Carmel A. Levitan, Neil Levy, Jackson G. Lu, Michał Misiak, Roxana E. Morariu, Jennifer Novak, Ekaterina Pronizius, Irina Prusova, Athulya S. Rathnayake, Marina O. Romanova, Jan P. Röer, Waldir M. Sampaio, Christoph Schild, Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Ian D. Stephen, Peter Szecsi, Elizabeth Takacs, Julia N. Teeter, Elian H. Thiele-Evans, Julia Valeiro-Paterlini, Iris Vilares, Louise Villafana, Ke Wang, Raymond Wu, Sara Álvarez-Solas, Hannah Moshontz, and Erin M. Buchanan
According to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, people can truly know something only if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is JTB). This account was challenged by Gettier, who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called “Gettier-type cases,” wherein protagonists are justified in believing something to be true, but their belief was correct only because of luck. Laypeople may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. Although some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions, Turri et al. found no evidence that participants attributed knowledge in a counterfeit-object Gettier-type case differently than in a matched case of JTB. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ Experiment 1 (N = 4,724) using a within-participants design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions, we did find evidence for Gettier intuitions; participants were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of JTB than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be detectable across different scenarios and cultural contexts. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. vignette produced the smallest effect, which was similar in size to that observed in the original study. Differences across vignettes suggest that epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.
Braeden Hall, Kathleen Schmidt, Jordan Wagge, Savannah C. Lewis, Sophia C. Weissgerber, Felix Kiunke, Gerit Pfuhl, Stefan Stieger, Ulrich S. Tran, Krystian Barzykowski, Natalia Bogatyreva, Marta Kowal, KarlIJn Massar, Felizitas Pernerstofer, Piotr Sorokowski, Martin Voracek, Christopher R. Chartier, Mark J. Brandt, Jon E. Grahe, Asil A. Özdoğru, Michael R. Andreychik, Sau-Chin Chen, Thomas R. Evans, Caro Hautekiet, Hans IJzerman, Pavol Kačmár, Anthony J. Krafnick, Erica D. Musser, Evie Vergauwe, Kaitlyn M. Werner, Balazs Aczel, Patrícia Arriaga, Carlota Batres, Jennifer L. Beaudry, Florian Cova, Simona Ďurbisová, Leslie D. Cramblet Alvarez, Gilad Feldman, Hendrik Godbersen, Jaroslav Gottfried, Gerald J. Haeffel, Andree Hartanto, Chris Isloi, Joseph P. McFall, Marina Milyavskaya, David Moreau, Ester Nosáľová, Kostas Papaioannou, Susana Ruiz-Fernandez, Jana Schrötter, Daniel Storage, Kevin Vezirian, Leonhard Volz, Yanna J. Weisberg, Qinyu Xiao, Dana Awlia, Hannah W. Branit, Megan R. Dunn, Agata Groyecka-Bernard, Ricky Haneda, Julita Kielinska, Caroline Kolle, Paweł Lubomski, Alexys M. Miller, Martin J. Mækelæ, Mytro Pantazi, Rafael R. Ribeiro, Robert M. Ross, Agnieszka Sorokowska, Christopher L. Aberson, Xanthippi Alexi Vassiliou, Bradley J. Baker, Miklos Bognar, Chin Wen Cong, Alex F. Danvers, William E. Davis, Vilius Dranseika, Andrei Dumbravă, Harry Farmer, Andy P. Field, Patrick S. Forscher, Aurélien Graton, Nandor Hajdu, Peter A. Howlett, Radosław Kabut, Emmett M. Larsen, Sean T. H. Lee, Nicole Legate, Carmel A. Levitan, Neil Levy, Jackson G. Lu, Michał Misiak, Roxana E. Morariu, Jennifer Novak, Ekaterina Pronizius, Irina Prusova, Athulya S. Rathnayake, Marina O. Romanova, Jan P. Röer, Waldir M. Sampaio, Christoph Schild, Michael Schulte-Mecklenbeck, Ian D. Stephen, Peter Szecsi, Elizabeth Takacs, Julia N. Teeter, Elian H. Thiele-Evans, Julia Valeiro-Paterlini, Iris Vilares, Louise Villafana, Ke Wang, Raymond Wu, Sara Álvarez-Solas, Hannah Moshontz, and Erin M. Buchanan
According to the justified true belief (JTB) account of knowledge, people can truly know something only if they have a belief that is both justified and true (i.e., knowledge is JTB). This account was challenged by Gettier, who argued that JTB does not explain knowledge attributions in certain situations, later called “Gettier-type cases,” wherein protagonists are justified in believing something to be true, but their belief was correct only because of luck. Laypeople may not attribute knowledge to protagonists with justified but only luckily true beliefs. Although some research has found evidence for these so-called Gettier intuitions, Turri et al. found no evidence that participants attributed knowledge in a counterfeit-object Gettier-type case differently than in a matched case of JTB. In a large-scale, cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri and colleagues’ Experiment 1 (N = 4,724) using a within-participants design and three vignettes across 19 geopolitical regions, we did find evidence for Gettier intuitions; participants were 1.86 times more likely to attribute knowledge to protagonists in standard cases of JTB than to protagonists in Gettier-type cases. These results suggest that Gettier intuitions may be detectable across different scenarios and cultural contexts. However, the size of the Gettier intuition effect did vary by vignette, and the Turri et al. vignette produced the smallest effect, which was similar in size to that observed in the original study. Differences across vignettes suggest that epistemic intuitions may also depend on contextual factors unrelated to the criteria of knowledge, such as the characteristics of the protagonist being evaluated.Keywords: folk epistemology, beliefs, social cognition, epistemic intuitions, justified true belief, multilevel modeling, multilab, replication
Citation: Hall, B., Schmidt, K., Wagge, J., Lewis, S. C., Weissgerber, S. C., Kiunke, F., Pfuhl, G., Stieger, S., Tran, U. S., Barzykowski, K., Bogatyreva, N., Kowal, M., Massar, K., Pernerstofer, F., Sorokowski, P., Voracek, M., Chartier, C. R., Brandt, M. J., Grahe, J. E., . . . Buchanan, E. M. (2024). Registered replication report: A large multilab cross-cultural conceptual replication of Turri et al. (2015). Advances in Methods and Practices in Psychological Science, 7(4), 1-38. https://doi.org/10.1177/25152459241267902
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